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THE SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS

Equipment Leases Under U.C.C.
Article 2A-Analysis and Practice
Suggestionst
by Robert D. (Bo) Strauss*

I.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") now has an article that directly covers equipment leases-Article 2A-although many states have
not enacted it yet. Article 2A's scope extends to leases of "goods" (e.g.,
t This Article is based on the author's chapter by the same name in COMMERCIAL LAW
(1991), published by Callaghan & Company. Predecessor versions have been
published by the American Bar Association, the American Association of Equipment
Lessors (now known as the Equipment Leasing Association of America), the Commercial
Law League of America, and the Practicing Law Institute.
* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (B.A.,
1973; J.D., 1976). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The author chairs the Leasing Subcommittee in the American Bar Association's Business Law Section's Uniform Commercial Code
Committee, and the Article 2A Subcommittee in the State Bar of Georgia's Corporate &
Banking Law Section's Uniform Commercial Code Committee.
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equipment and vehicle leases, but not leases of real estate, intangibles, or
other nongoods). 1
Article 2A compiles and codifies the best of the common law of leases,
and reduces the uncertainty created by inconsistent decisions under pre2A law. Pre-2A leasing law was hampered by uncertainties in the following areas in particular: (1) definitional (distinguishing a lease from a secured sale or loan), (2) applicability of U.C.C. Article 2 (e.g., implied warranties, parol evidence, unconscionability), and (3) nonbankruptcy
enforcement and remedies.2 Article 2A and the related amendment to
U.C.C. section 1-201(37), which address these uncertainties and others,
were approved by the American Law Institute in May 1987. They have
since been adopted in about twenty states, and have been proposed in
about half the other state legislatures. Considering that an estimated
thirty percent of capital equipment in the United States is acquired
through leasing, it is surprising that this aspect of commercial finance had
not previously been covered in the U.C.C.
California and some of the other states that have adopted Article 2A
modified the 1987 Official Text when they adopted it. In response to
those changes, the Standby Committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for Article 2A proposed amendments to the 1987 Official Text that the American Law Institute approved. Those changes were incorporated into the Official Text in December 1990. All references in this article are to the 1990 Official Text unless
otherwise specified. Of course, the changed text will become effective only
to the extent it is adopted by the states.
This article analyzes the "competing" versions of Article 2A, and suggests how practitioners in Article 2A jurisdictions should change their
forms and procedures from their pre-2A practices. The discussion in this
article applies only to commercial (nonconsumer) leases.
II. COMPARISON WITH ARTICLE 2
As its name implies, Article 2A is based on U.C.C. Article 2, and it
follows Article 2 except where differences are dictated by fundamental
differences between sales and leases, and except in a few instances where
the drafting committee thought that changes were necessary because of

1. See U.C.C. § 2A-102 cmt. (1990).
2. Article 2A's original impetus was Charles W. Mooney Jr.'s article in 36 Bus. LAW. 1605
(July 1981) entitled PersonalProperty Leasing: A Challenge, which on pages 1610-20 identified the uncertainties referred to in the text.
3. Approval previously was obtained from the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code and from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
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flagrant deficiencies in Article 2. As with Article 2 and the rest of the
U.C.C., freedom of contract prevails and most of the provisions of Article
2A can be "drafted out" of an agreement, 4 so with a few exceptions Article 2A serves mainly to fill gaps that the parties did not expressly cover.
As with Article 2, this fact is more important to the practitioner than the
text of the U.C.C. itself.
In addition to the more significant differences discussed below, Article
2A differs from Article 2 in the commercial (nonconsumer) area by (1)
omitting Article 2's "battle of the forms" provision; 5 (2) increasing the
lessor's potential damages after justifiable nondelivery in commercial
leases;s (3) modifying the statute of frauds provision so that a merchant
lessor/lessee does not lose the statute of frauds defense by failing to object to the other party's letter or memo;7 (4) eliminating any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness, or against infringement, in finance
leases;8 and (5) changing the starting point for the statute of limitations
to the time of discovery or default, whichever is later.9
III.

DEFINITION OF TRUE LEASE

Without guidance from Article 2A and revised section 1-201(37), courts
have relied on numerous subjective, extraneous, and contradictory criteria
to determine whether a purported lease should be recognized as a true
lease or recharacterized as a security interest (i.e., secured loan or secured
installment sale). For example, in finding a "lease" to be an unperfected
"security interest", many courts have ignored inherent economic indicia
such as the property's estimated useful life at lease-end and instead have
given weight to external indicia showing that the transaction "looked"
like a secured sale; for example, that the lessor was not in the leasing
business, that a full-payout lease was involved, or even that a third-party
-guarantee was obtained."0 To understand why those criteria are misleading, assume that First National Leasing leases to Big Corporation, and
that the transaction's inherent economic and legal attributes make it a
"true lease". An identical transaction should remain a lease even if the
lessor is my grandmother, or if the rent is higher, or if the lessee is, my
4.
5.

See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1962).
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1962).

6. Id. § 2A-504(3)(b) (1990).
7.
8.
9.
10.

Compare U.C.C. § 2A-201 (1990) with § 2-201(2) (1962).
U.C.C. §§ 2A-212, -213, -211 (1990).
Compare U.C.C. § 2A-506(2) (1990) with § 2-725 (1962).
See, e.g., Guardsman Lease Plan, Inc. v. Gibraltar Transmission Corp., 494 N.Y.S.2d

59 (Sup. Ct. 1985); In re Mesa Refining, Inc., 52 B.R. 359 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); Citizens &
Southern Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 144 Ga. App. 800, 243

S.E.2d 243 (1978).
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grandmother but Big Corporation guarantees the lease. None of those
"factors" provides any substantive reason to transform a lease into a loan,
or a sale, or anything else.
The test should be one of commercial reality. A long-term net lease is
economically similar to a secured installment sale, and "rent" similar to
principal plus interest, if the "lessee" will use and maintain the property
for all or most of its useful life or if the present value of the "lessor's"
end-of-term reversion is relatively insignificant. For example, a ten-year
lease of a car or a high-tech computer generally is functionally equivalent
to a sale or loan, because the asset's physical depreciation or technological
obsolescence during the lease term probably will leave almost no value or
useful life at the end of the lease term. The U.C.C. values reality over
formalities, so it should treat that transaction as a sale or loan despite its
being labeled "Lease".
If a "lease" is recharacterized as a secured loan or installment sale, the
possible consequences include: (1) the "ownership" interest becomes an
unperfected or subordinate security interest upon bankruptcy of the
"lessee", (2) the equipment may be sold in a bankruptcy proceeding free
of any interest of the "lessor", even if the "lease" was terminated before
the bankruptcy filing, (3) the remedies are limited due to the application
of Article 9, (4) the lessor is subject to warranty liability, ineffectiveness
of liability disclaimers, and variance in acceptance and revocation standards because of U.C.C. Article 2, and (5) the lessor becomes unexpectedly subject to laws as to usury, strict tort liability, consumer protection;
sales and use taxes, and property taxes.
Under pre-2A law, the "true lease" issue generally becomes a question
of whether the lease is one "intended as security" within the limited
guidelines supplied by the section 1-201(37) definition of "security interest". An amended definition of "security interest" is included with Article
2A, and as amended the definition provides considerably more guidance
in determining whether or not a "lease" should be recharacterized. The
new definition enumerates various tests to determine whether, in economic reality, the lessor has retained any meaningful residual interest:
the "lease" is a security interest if the lessor did not."1 The new definition
also states that a lease is not a security interest merely because it is a
full-payout lease or a net lease, or because the lessee has renewal or
purchase options or nonbargain fixed-price'renewal or purchase options.
Note that these standards focus on the transaction's economics, not on
the parties' "intent" (except to the extent that their intent is reflected in
the transaction's economics). Furthermore, the definition of "lease" in
11.

U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987).

1992]

EQUIPMENT LEASES

section 2A-103(1)(j) makes clear that a sale or security interest cannot
also be a "lease" for Article 2A purposes.
Many automobile leases contain a terminal rental adjustment clause
("TRAC") requiring that, at the end of the lease term, the "lessee" pay
the "lessor" for any shortfall in the resale price below the stipulated
residual value, and perhaps vice versa if there is any excess. For example,
a five-year TRAC lease of a $15,000 car might stipulate a $6,000 assumed
residual value, independent of charges for "excess mileage". Assume that
the lessee returns the car, without excess mileage, when the five-year term
expires, and that the lessor then sells the car for $5,000. The lessee then
will owe a $1,000 "terminal rental adjustment" payment to the lessor.
The common law and section 1-201(37) almost invariably would consider
TRAC leases to be security interests, because the "lessor" has no residual
risk and perhaps no residual upside. Some states that have adopted Article 2A also enacted companion legislation that permits a TRAC "lease" of
a motor vehicle to qualify as a true lease. This author believes that those'
TRAC lease amendments should be rejected.
Revised section 1-201(37) is not a provision that the parties can draft
around or vary by agreement. The economic facts and circumstances of
the transaction control. Typically, however, a cautious lawyer will recommend that economic conclusions be supported by a contemporaneous independent appraisal (at least in larger transactions) and will file a precautionary UCC-1 financing statement under section 9-408.
IV.

WARRANTY LIABILITY OF LESSORS; TREATMENT OF "FINANCE
LESSORS"

Without Article 2A, courts and practitioners would continue to try to
resolve questions of express and implied warranties, and exclusion of warranties, by applying the law of bailment (which is ill-suited to modern
leasing), or by attempting to apply Article 2 by analogy. Article 2 applies
to transactions in goods "[ulnless the context otherwise requires. .. ."
Courts have decided all different ways on whether the personal property
leasing context "otherwise requires". Some courts apply the Article 2
"implied warranty" provisions to leases generally,13 other courts apply
Article 2 provisions when the transaction is "analogous to a sale",1 4 others
imply lessor warranties (in the absence of a disclaimer) if a merchant les-

12. Id. § 2-102 (1962).
13. See, e.g., Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
14. See, e.g., Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975);
Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (Ill. App. 1977).

858
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sor rather than a finance lessor is involved, 15 and still others hold that
Article 2 does not apply to true leases at all."
Under Article 2A, warranty treatment depends on whether a "finance
lease" is involved. ' If a finance lease is not involved, then essentially the
same warranty rules apply to leases as to Article 2 sales. In many cases, of
course, the sales warranties rather than the lease warranties will be the
important ones to the user. As a result, in states that have adopted the
most restrictive privity provision from among the three section 2-318 alternatives,"' lessees under leases that are not finance leases will continue
to be without warranties and without recourse to the manufacturer in
many cases. If a finance lease is involved, section 2A-209 automatically
extends the seller's warranties (and their exclusions) to the lessee, to the
extent of the lessee's leasehold interest, and automatically excludes any
implied warranties of fitness or merchantability by the lessor."
A "finance lease", as defined in the 1987 Official Text of Section 2A103(1)(g), consists of an overall three-party transaction in which (1) the
lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply (in the inventory sense) the
goods, (2) the lessor did not own the goods before the lease was arranged,
and (3) the lessee approves the purchase contract before the lease becomes effective.20 Note that, by focusing on the transaction rather than
the identity of the parties, this definition can include lessors who are not
financial institutions and lessors who operate or repair the leased property after the lease begins. A lessor whose lease does not qualify as a finance lease can achieve the same result contractually by properly disclaiming warranties and other drafting.2
These new rules have several practical implications. First, commercial
lessors should continue to disclaim warranties "conspicuously" and
should continue to include express "hell or high water" clauses, if for no
other reason than to avoid arguments about whether a finance lease is
involved. Second, a leveraged lessor should conspicuously note in the
lease agreement that its secured lender has rights in the equipment and
15. See, e.g., Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bingham, 60 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967); Patriot General Life Ins. Co. v. CFC Inv. Co., 420 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. App.
1981).
16. See, e.g., R & W Leasing, Inc. v. Mosher, 636 P.2d 832 (Mont. 1981); Alpiser v. Eagle
Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 389 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Mark Singleton Buick, Inc.
v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 630, 391 S.E.2d 435 (1990).
17. U.C.C. §§ 2A-212, -213 (1990).
18. Alternative A in U.C.C. § 2-318 (1966).
19. U.C.C. § 2A-209 (1990).
20. Id. § 2A-103(1)(g) (1987) (amended 1990). The California Version and 1990 Official
Text are slightly broader. See CAL. COM. CODE § 10103(1)(g) (West 1990); U.C.C. § 2A103(1)(g) (1990).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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the lease. 2 Third, in order to preserve the benefit of pass-through warranties, a lessee should notify the equipment supplier of the finance lease,
2
thereby preventing warranty amendments without the lessee's consent.
Fourth, an equipment supplier who provides customer lease financing
through a leasing affiliate should ensure that the sale contract to its affiliate conspicuously disclaims all implied warranties-otherwise, implied
warranties may be passed from the supplier through to the lessee even if
the affiliate-lessor conspicuously disclaims all implied lessor warranties.24
Fifth, a lessor engaged in vendor financing should continue to take precautions to avoid assuming any warranties or representations made by
the vendor's equipment sales representative.2

V. NONBANKRUPTcY ENFORCEMENT, REMEDIES, AND DAMAGES FOR
LESSORS AND LESSEES
As stated by Al Reisman and Charles (Chuck) Mooney:
[tihere is, perhaps, no topic related to equipment leasing transactions
that has yielded more confusing, inconsistent authorities and poorly conceptualized and articulated analyses than the subject of true lease remedies. As a group, the reported decisions on the remedies of bailors for
hire (true lessors) reflect a hopeless morass of analogies to real estate,
contract, and personal property security laws, including such doctrines
and theories as election of remedies, mitigation of damages, liquidated
damages, termination, acceleration of rents, and alternative and cumulative remedies.28

Among the more serious errors that courts periodically have made in the
remedies area are (1) measuring the lessor's damages as the difference
between (undiscounted) accelerated future rent and the entire net recov22. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-211(I), -214 (1990).
23.

Id. § 2A-209(3).

24. For example, assume that XYZ Manufacturing Company sells the to-be-leased
equipment to XYZ Leasing Company and that XYZ Leasing Company leases the equipment
to the customer under a finance lease. Such an "all in the family" transaction could tempt
XYZ Manufacturing to avoid what appears to it to be red-tape formalities. XYZ Manfacturing therefore might avoid using a bill of sale that conspicuously disclaims the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Under U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315, and -316, a merchant
seller automatically gives such warranties to the buyer unless the seller conspicuously disclaims them or meets another § 2-316 exception. Once the manufacturer-seller legally gives
those warranties to the buyer-lessor, U.C.C. § 2A-209 automatically passes them along to the
lessee.
25. For an example of the problem, see Potomac Leasing Co. v. Thrasher, 181 Ga. App.
883, 354 S.E.2d 210 (1987).
26. 1 ALBERT F. REISMAN & CHARLES W, MooNEY, JR.,
LEASING 80 (Bruce E. Fritch, et al. eds., 3d ed. 1988).
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ery after a post-repossession sale, thereby depriving the lessor of its
residual interest but simultaneously overcompensating the lessor for future rentals," (2) measuring the lessor's damages by the difference between scheduled termination value and the nit proceeds from a post-repossession sale, thereby including the increase or decrease in residual
value in the computation of damages for breach of the lease, 5 (3) improperly deciding whether and how to allow acceleration of future rent," (4)
invoking the "election of remedies" doctrine to prevent the lessor from
both repossessing and recovering damages, 30 (5) permitting the lessor
both to repossess and to recover (undiscounted) accelerated rent," and
(6) applying the section 9-504 "commercially reasonable sale" requirement to post-repossession sales.32 Even in states whose courts have not
created such analytical errors, statutory clarity still would be helpful to
judges and practitioners.
Essentially, Article 2A's statutory pattern for a lessee default partakes
of Article 2, Article 9, and the common law. The parties generally may
agree to their own default and remedies sections even if different from
the Article 2A standards, 3 although over time the validity of such provisions may increasingly be tested against the Article 2A framework. If the
lease agreement is silent as to default or remedies, or if its remedies are
invalid, Article 2A will provide a safety net.
Under Article 2A, notice of default or enforcement generally is unnecessary unless required by the lease agreement.3 ' The lessor may repossess, 5 may dispose of the leased property by sale, re-lease, or otherwise,"
and may recover incidental damages based on the present value of the
rental shortfall under the re-lease, if the re-lease is substantially similar
to the lease,37 or based on the present value of the remaining lease rent

27. Puritan Leasing Co. v. August, 546 P.2d 679 (Cal. 1976).
28. Computer Sys. of America, Inc. v. Western Reserve Life Assurance Co., 475 N.E.2d
745 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
29. Compare Fairfield Lease Corp. v. 717 Pharmacy, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1981), afj'd, 460 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (N.Y. App. Term 1983) (acceleration prohibited in absence of lessor's repossession and mitigation) and Wolf v. Buchman, 425 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
Dist. Ct, App. 1983) (damages based on future rent prohibited since contract did not provide for acceleration) with W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 653 P.2d 791 (Idaho
1982) (acceleration permitted provided future rents are discounted to present value).
30. Litton Indus. Credit Corp. v. Catanuto, 394 A.2d 191 (Conn. 1978).
31. Robinson v. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
32. Executive Com. Serv., Ltd. v. Vapor Corp., 481 N.E.2d 16 (I1. App. Ct. 1985).
33. U.C.C. § 2A-503(1) (1990).
34. Id. § 2A-502.
35. Id. § 2A-525.
36. Id. § 2A-527(1).
37. Id. § 2A-527(2).
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minus market rent (or, if greater, the lessor's expected profit).3 8 Section
2A-507 provides standards for determining market rent. Section 2A-529
permits the lessor to recover accelerated rents (discounted to present
value), without any express requirement in the Official Text (subject, perhaps, to the U.C.C.'s general "reasonableness" requirement in section 1203) that the lessor mitigate damages, and with a mitigation requirement
for this section in the California version.3 9 The discount rate for deter-

mining present value in damages calculations may be specified in the
lease agreement in advance, provided that the rate chosen was not "mani40
festly unreasonable" on the lease execution date.
Even if actual damages could be ascertained without difficulty, the
lease agreement may provide for liquidated damages, including loss of tax
benefits or damage to the lessor's residual interest, provided that the liquidation or formula is reasonable in light of the anticipated harm. 4' Article 2A has no general requirement that dispositions of repossessed equipment be made in a commercially reasonable manner as does section 9504(1), although recoverable damages generally are computed as if mitigation had occurred. The 1990 amendments make clear that the foregoing
remedies are exercisable only after the occurrence of a material lessee default of the type described in amended section 2A-523. A lessor's exercise
of remedies for an immaterial default would be subject to the "reasonableness" requirement of section 1-203 even under the 1987 Official Text.
Article 2A also sets forth lessee remedies for a lessor's predelivery or
postdelivery default, essentially modelled after a buyer's rights under Article 2 following a seller's default.'2
Some commentators have concluded that the remedies provisions in the
"uniform" version of Article 2A include several deficiencies and ambiguities, such as whether a lessor has any duty to dispose of repossessed
38.

Id. §§ 2A-527(3), -528.

39.

CAL. COM. CODE § 10529 (West 1990).

40.

U.C.C.

§ 2A-103(1)(u) (1990). A low default discount rate in a lease agreement that

has a high interest or discount rate for other purposes would be vulnerable.
41. Id. § 2A-504(1). Alternate formulas for measuring liquidated damages, which allo'w
the lessor to select the highest recovery, might be vulnerable as not providing a true "liquidation". Formulas that place the risk of residual value declines (e.g., resale price vs. stipulated value) on the lessee also are vulnerable, at least where the remaining lease term is
short relative to the equipment's remaining useful life. Accelerated rental clauses also might
be vulnerable unless the lessee is obligated to mitigate damages (or actually does mitigate).
42.

Id. §§ 2A-508, -522.
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4" However, the California version expressly negates any such
equipment.
44
duty.

When drafting the default and remedies sections in an Article 2A jurisdiction,, lessors should continue to draft full default and remedies sections

rather than merely incorporating Article 2A by reference. Lessors also
should continue to reserve all remedies provided by law, and should continue to specify lessor rights to terminate, repossess, accelerate rents, and
sell or re-lease equipment, all at the lessor's option. The lessor will want
to specify a low but reasonable discount rate for accelerated rent, keeping
in mind both its economic desires and the maxim that "hogs get slaughtered".45 If the lessor's bargain is based in part on factors that might not
'be apparent to a court, the lessor should consider noting them in the
lease agreement, thereby preventing a re-lease that does not include those
factors from being considered "substantially similar to the original lease
contract".48 In drafting any measure of damages that compares market
rent with contract rent for the remaining lease term, lessor's counsel
sholld ensure that market rent "credits" do not begin to accrue until after the lessor has repossessed the equipment and had a reasonable opportunity to remarket it. 7 Lessors should continue to include liquidated or
"formula" damage clauses.
VI.

FIXTURES AND ACCESSIONS

Section 2A-309 addresses the lessor's rights in fixtures. They are similar
to a secured party's rights under U.C.C. section 9-313, with some varia-

tions. Section 2A-309 essentially provides that a lessor will have priority
over a landlord or mortgagee if the lessor files a UCC-1 fixture filing
before the landlord or mortgagee files in the real estate records (or, for
"purchase money leases", if the lessor files within 10 days after the goods
43. See id. §§ 2A-527(1), -527(3), -529(1)(b) (these sections being generally similar to the
1987 Official Text). These issues are well presented in Donald J. Rapson, Deficiencies and
Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure
Problems in the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REv. 875 (1988).
44. See CAL. CoM. CODE § 10528(1) (West 1990).
45. Cf. In re United Am. Fin. Corp., 55 B.R. 117, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) ("the
injured party ... is not entitled to be placed in a better condition by the recovery of damages than he would have been had the contract been fully performed").
46. The Official Comment to § 2A-527 describes several factors that should be considered in determining whether the re-lease is "substantially similar" to the original lease; the
list does not purport to be comprehensive. U.C.C. § 2A-527 cmt. (1990).
47. See id. § 2A-528(1)(b). The 1987 Official Text of § 2A-528 starts market rent credits
upon default, and the California Version and 1990 Official Text start those credits upon
repossession, in each case subject to § 2A-528(2) (which states that, if the statutory formulas
are inadequate, then the lessor is entitled to recover its lost profit (whatever that means)).
See CAL. COM. CODE § 10528(1)(a), (b) (West 1990); U.C.C. § 2A-528(1) (1990).
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become fixtures and there is no prior construction mortgage).' s Thus, a
prudent lessor will continue to make a fixture filing in the real estate
records if the leased equipment is or might become a fixture.
Regardless of whether the lessor files, the lessor will have priority over
the landlord or mortgagee if the fixtures are "readily removable" (unless
the fixtures are primarily used to operate the real estate, as with heating
and air conditioning equipment, in which case the landlord or mortgagee
would have priority absent a consent or disclaimer to the contrary), or if
the lessee has the right to remove the goods. 4 9 The lessor also will have
priority over judgment liens obtained after the lease begins." Finally, a
lessor having priority has the express right to remove fixtures after the
lease ends or goes into default, but must reimburse the landlord or mortgagee for physical damage to the premises caused by the removal.5 1
Section 2A-310 addresses the lessor's rights in accessions in a manner
almost identical in substance to a secured party's rights under section 9314. That is, if the leased goods become an accession after the lease begins, the accession lessor's interests are superior to all others except (1)
the interest of a buyer (or lessee) in the ordinary course of business buying (or leasing) after the accession lease began, and (2) the interest of a
creditor with a prior perfected security interest in the "whole" (i.e., the
equipment to which the accession is attached) who makes future advances without knowledge of the accession lease. 2 A lessor having priority has the express right to remove accessions under standards substantially identical to those for fixture removal.53
VII. FILING REQUIREMENTS
Article 2A does not have any general filing requirement for true leases.
As noted above, however, a lessor must make a fixture filing to protect
against landlord or mortgagee claims if the equipment becomes "fixtures".54 Article 2A also defers to any filing requirements in state or federal certificate-of-title statutes.5 Article 9, of course, still requires filing
for perfection as to any lease that is recharacterized as a security interest
under section 1-201(37), and cautious lessors generally will continue to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

U.C.C. § 2A-309(4)(a), (b) (1990).
Id. § 2A-309(5)(a), (d).
Id. § 2A-309(5)(b).
Id. § 2A-309(8).
Id. § 2A-310(2), (4).
See id. § 2A-309(8), -310(5).
See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
See U.C.C. §§ 2A-104, -105 (1990).
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make precautionary filings under U.C.C. section 9-408 to defuse the
issue."
VIII.

LIMITS ON ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASING

The 1987 Official Text of section 2A-303(7) requires that language
prohibiting "the transfer of an interest of a party under a lease contract"
be "specific" and "conspicuous".67 Besides requiring lessors and lessees to
boldface, capitalize, or underline their anti-assignment clauses, this section also requires lessors to put at least one anti-subleasing sentence in
conspicuous type. The conspicuousness requirement applies to finance
lessors as well as others. The 1990 amendments delete the conspicuousness requirement for nonconsumer leases, but that requirement currently
is the law in several 2A states.
Unlike the 1987 Official Text, the 1990 Official Text also invalidates
prohibitions on security assignments of a party's interest in the lease or
the equipment, except to the extent that an actual transfer occurs and is
harmful to the other party." This prohibition goes further than the
U.C.C. section 9-318(4) rule that invalidates prohibitions on security assignments of accounts, and to the extent that it does, it is an unreasonable restriction on the parties' freedom of contract and an unwarranted
departure from the U.C.C.'s general principle that parties should be able
to reach their own agreements."
Finally, the 1990 Official Text (but not the 1987 Official Text) for section 2A-303 makes clear that a prohibited transfer may be effective as to
third parties, even if making the transfer causes the transferor to be in
default under the lease agreement.8 0
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

After the lessee has accepted the property under a finance lease, the
lessee essentially has no right to revoke." In commercial leases, sections
.2A-407 and -508(6) create a statutory "hell or high water" clause by making the lessee's (payment) obligations irrevocable, and independent of the
lessor's obligation. 2 These provisions are merely codifications of standard
commercial leasing practices that currently are achieved by contract
56.

U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-408 (1987).

57. U.C.C. § 2A-303(7) (1987) (amended 1990).
58. Id. § 2A-303(3) (1990).
59. That principle appears in U.C.C.
60. U.C.C. § 2A-303(2) (1990).
61. See id. §§ 2A-516, -517.
62. Id. §§ 2A-407, 508(6).

§ 1-102(3) (1987).

19921

EQUIPMENT LEASES

865

rather than by statute. However, it is hard to understand why a statute
should do so. Since the lessor can achieve the same result by express contractual language, this aspect of Article 2A is a trap for the unwary: it
allows a lessor to defeat the ordinary business expectations of an unsophisticated lessee through silence. For example, it allows a computer lessor to promise vital services to the lessee, then to breach this promise
entirely, yet require the lessee to continue paying rent without recoupment or set-off, all without any express clause in the lease agreement. In
the author's opinion, section 2A-407 should not be enacted in its present
form, even though lessors almost universally will achieve the same result
by adding the necessary clauses to their lease agreements.
In addition, section 2A-308(3) overrides vendor-in-possession laws that
override
treat sale-leasebacks as per se or prima facie frauds, but this
3
applies only if the lessor bought for value and in good faith.
X.

PRovisIoNs UNDULY FAVORABLE TO LESSORS BUT OF LIMITED
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Perhaps because of an absence of organized input by any commercial
lessee contingent during the drafting stages, Article 2A includes several
provisions that are improperly slanted in favor of lessors and against lessees. Besides those described in the two preceding sections of this article," Article 2A has several pro-lessor provisions that do not necessarily
have enough practical impact to require nonuniform amendments.
First, section 2A-211(1) limits the lessor's implied warranty of title by
excluding third-party acts, such as a lien created by the lessor's predecessor. As between the lessor and the lessee, it would seem fairer that the
lessor take responsibility for such a lien if the lease contract is silent, as
the seller does under section 2-312(1). The lease contract generally will
cover this point, however, and section 2A-307(3) will protect a "lessee in
the ordinary course of business".
Second, if the lease agreement is silent, section 2A-502 states that a
defaulting party is not entitled to notice of default or of enforcement,
except as otherwise provided in Article 2A's Part 5 (the part covering
defaults). Part 5 then requires the lessee to notify the lessor of most important defaults and enforcement and provides a statutory cure opportunity for lessors. 5 Lessees have many duties besides payment, and they
should have similar rights of notice and cure; transplanting the Article 2
seller-buyer standards to a lessor-lessee relationship is unjust; However,
the parties can contract around the problem; most lessors assume few
63. Id. § 2A-308(3).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
65.

See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2A-509(2), -513, -514, -516(3), -517 (1990).
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continuing duties; and even if one-sided, giving notice and, the right to
cure usually are not burdensome to lessees.
XI.

PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO PORTFOLIO LENDERS

If a lessee effectively prohibits the lessor from transferring its interest
in the lease (including a prohibition in a related agreement or side letter),
then section 2A-303(1)(a) of the 1987 Official Text prevents the lessor
from assigning lease rentals to a lender. This result is contrary to many
interpretations of section 9-318(4) under pre-2A law. Therefore, prudent
portfolio lenders will include a lessee consent provision in its lessordebtor's forms, by which the lessee conspicuously consents to the lender's
security interest, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary.
The 1990 Official Text of section 2A-303 permits a lessor to grant a security interest in the leased equipment even if the lease agreement prohibits
it, but would validate a prohibition on the foreclosure of such a security
interest in certain circumstances. As noted above, the 1990 Amendments
go too far, because they permit security interests to be granted and foreclosed upon even if sophisticated
parties have unambiguously bargained
6
for the opposite result.

Even if the lease agreement does not prohibit lessor transfers, section
2A-303(1)(b) of the 1987 Official Text invalidates a transfer that materially changes the lessee's rights or duties if, promptly after the lessee
learns of the transfer, the lessee demands that the transferee essentially
guarantee the lessor's performance and the transferee refuses to do so.
Some commentators have expressed concern that a lessee could attempt
to invoke this provision to defeat a lessor's security assignment, although
this provision would seem inapplicable to most security interests. Section
2A-303(3) and (4) of the 1990 Official Text requires the lessee to make a
more specific showing of harm in order to resist such a lessor transfer.
Finally, since Article 2A is silent on whether the lessor's lease rights
(including rent) are "proceeds" under section 9-306, and since some of
the meager case law concludes that those rights are not proceeds, lenders
still should expressly include chattel paper and lease rights (including
rent) in their collateral descriptions.
XII. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

As with any new law, Article 2A may be expected to introduce unforeseen problems to the leasing arena that, when identified, will need to be
dealt with by practitioners' draftsmanship, judicial interpretation, legisla66.

See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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tive change, or supplementation to the Official Comments. For example,
it is difficult to anticipate the exact effects of section 2A-108's express
prohibition of unconscionability, because few courts or practitioners previously applied unconscionability standards to nonconsumer leases.67 In
assessing which lease clauses might become unenforceable under the unconscionability standard, practitioners should pay special attention to the
reasonableness of waivers and other limitations on lessee rights, particularly those appearing in inconspicuous type in printed, unnegotiated lease
forms.
Article 2A does not deal with leases that are Article 9 security interests
under section 1-201(37), but in which the lessor has a residual interest,
such as an eight-year lease of a computer or a lease having a ten percent
purchase option for equipment expected to retain most of its original
value at lease end. It has been suggested that this issue could be addressed by adding a "Part 6" to Article 9, dealing with such items as the
calculation of (imputed) interest or discount, or calculation of the amount
that the "lessor"-creditor is owed, or other remedial matters.
Finally, perhaps because Article 2A was modeled after Article 2, Article
2A does not cover a number of leasing issues that do not have analogues
in the sales context, such as (1) in the 1987 Official Text, explicit protection of the lessor's reversionary interest,"s (2) explicit coverage of the
lessee's obligation to return the leased equipment, (3) the amount of care
that the lessee must exercise, and (4) the distribution of responsibility for
maintenance and repair.6 9 In each case, of course, the parties may cover
those points by contractual agreement.

67. But see United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 319 N.Y.S.2d 531
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) (finance lessor's disclaimer of warranties unconscionable where lessee
had negotiated only with equipment supplier); Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d
651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); and Dillman & Assocs., Inc. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 442
N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (recognizing unconscionability doctrine but refusing to find
actual unconscionability in lease between business entities of equal sophistication). Dilman
is cited with approval in the Official Comment to § 2A-108. A good discussion of unconscionability can be found in Edwin E.Huddleson, III, Leases of Goods (Article 2A), in 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE ch. 11, § 11:18 (Callaghan Supp. 1991).
68. This issue is expressly covered by § 2A-532 of the California Version and 1990 Official Text, under "Lessor's Rights to Residual Interest". See CAL. COM. CODE § 10532 (West
1990); U.C.C. § 2A-532 (1990).
69. See Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and
Scholar, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575, 602-03 (1988).

